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INTRODUCTION
Big-city sidewalk vendors have long hawked "Rolex" watches and
"Donna Karan" t-shirts. In an upscale twist on the theme, the Wall
Street Journal recently reported that "purse parties," in which hostesses
sell knockoff designer goods to their friends, are a hot new trend, al-
beit with the potential downside of jail time.' Such counterfeits have
become a huge business and a major challenge for law enforcement.
At a Garment District warehouse in December 2003, New York police
netted $1 million worth of counterfeit handbags purporting to be
made by Louis Vuitton Malletier, Burberry Ltd., Chanel, Inc., and
other luxury manufacturers.! For Coach, Inc., a maker of handbags
and one of the standbys of the sidewalk scene and purse parties, the
story is all too familiar: the company's goods turn up regularly in such
stings.3
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2 $1 Million in Counterfeit Designer Merchandise is Seized, N.Y. SUN, Dec. 19, 2003, at 3.
3 For instance, Coach goods turned up in a November 2002 raid in Brooklyn.
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To the extent that they care about legal niceties, copycat manufac-
turers may be relying on the Supreme Court's 2001 observation that
"in many instances there is no prohibition against copying goods and
products.... Allowing competitors to copy will have salutary effects in
many instances. 4 Yet, the Court also carefully noted that copiers may
not infringe recognized intellectual property rights.5 Coach hand-
bags, for example, are protected by federal statute and common law
governing the use of trade dress,6 a subset of trademark law that en-
compasses both product design and product packaging. The past sev-
eral years have witnessed evolving legal standards for trade dress pro-
tection, offering the prospect of legal redress against the many-headed
Hydra of the counterfeit industry.
The Supreme Court's 2000 decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sam-
ara Brothers7 was widely expected to fundamentally limit the extent of
legal protections for trade dress. For product design, one category of
trade dress, the picture indeed looked ominous: the Supreme Court
stated that distinctiveness, one of the elements necessary to protect a
valid trademark, could no longer be found "inherent," or automatic,
for product design simply by virtue of its uniqueness . Instead, dis-
tinctiveness now requires proving that the trade dress has acquired
secondary meaning, defined as a connection in consumers' minds be-
tween the product and its manufacturer. 9 To show secondary mean-
ing, the trade dress owner must prove that the trade dress identifies
the source of the product to consumers.10
Immediately after the case, commentators lamented the "death
knell" sounded by the Court for product design trademark owners.1 1
Observers feared that, without the possibility of claiming inherent
' TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) (citation
omitted).
5 See id. ("In general, unless an intellectual property right such as a patent or copy-
right protects an item, it will be subject to copying.")
6 See Coach, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9879, at *45-46 (giving trade dress protection to
Coach handbags).
7 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
8 Id. at 213-14.
9 Id. at 212-13 (describing the use of design features to "signal" to the consumer
the identity of the producer).10 Id. (noting that in product design cases, the "attribution of inherent distinctive-
ness" derives from "consumer predisposition to equate the feature [whether color,
packaging, word marks, or other design feature] with the source").
l" Tahj Gomes & Carla DeSilva, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.: The
Supreme Court Steps Back from Two Pesos and Requires Secondary Meaning in All Product De-
sign Trade Dress Cases, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 365, 370 (2001).
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distinctiveness, product design owners would have little legal
protection for their marks because the new requirement of proving
acquired distinctiveness was potentially onerous. 2 By narrowing the
scope of trade dress protection in an effort to forestall anti-
competitive strike suits, some argued, "Wal-Mart will likely benefit
[the] consumer's interests since it promotes competition in the
marketplace." 3 But for the counterfeit industry, Wal-Mart "could have
the unfortunate effect of encouraging the practice of 'knock-offs,'
especially in the fashion industry.'
4
While Wal-Mart deprived trade dress of automatic, or inherent,
distinctiveness, TrafFix, decided by the Supreme Court a year later, in-
creased the difficulty with which trade dress owners must demonstrate
non-functionality.'5 Although these two cases seemed to indicate that
the Supreme Court had significantly raised the bar for product design
protection, the Wal-Mart decision has not entirely stemmed the flow of
product design claims, nor has it precluded trade dress owners from
protecting their products from infringement. In fact, as I will discuss,
several trade dress owners have recently adapted to the new require-
ments set out by Wal-Mart and prevailed against infringers.
This Comment examines recent product design case law to evalu-
ate the effect of Wal-Mart on how secondary meaning can be shown by
trade dress owners, identifies which types of trade dress claims are
most likely to satisfy the secondary meaning requirement, and de-
scribes the growing rift among the circuits in the application of factors
that are used to evaluate secondary meaning. This Comment then
1 See, e.g., Joseph J. Ferretti, Product Design Trade Dress Hits the Wall... Mart: Wal-
Mart v. Samara Brothers, 42 IDEA 417, 449 (2002) (finding that "the Wal-Mart court
appears to have ignored the important underlying goals of trademark law: preventing
competitors from trading off the goodwill of another and protecting consumers from
being confused as to the source or origin of a company's goods or services");Jeffrey M.
Samuels & Linda B. Samuels, Trade Dress Undressed: Wal-Mart v. Samara, 29 A.I.P.L.A.
Q.J. 43, 63 (2001) (noting that Wal-Mart will "render legal protection for new de-
signs.., problematic and will create additional uncertainty in the law").
13 Antonia L. Sequeira, Recent Case, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, 16
BERKELEYTECH. LJ. 251, 260 (2001).
14 Christina Platt Hillson, Trade Dress Protection: When a Dress is Just a Dress According
to the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 461,
487 (2001).
15 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001). The Court
defined a functional feature as one "'the exclusive use of [which] would put competi-
tors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage."' Id. (quoting Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)). The Court further clarified that "a
feature is also functional when it is essential to the use or purpose of the device or
when it affects the cost or quality of the device." Id. at 33 (citations omitted).
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argues that product design litigation since Wal-Mart reveals a growing
gulf among the circuits' evidentiary requirements for proving secon-
dary meaning. In time, it will be necessary for the Supreme Court to
answer the question it posed, yet left unanswered, in Wal-Mart: "What
must be shown to establish that a product's design is inherently dis-
tinctive for purposes of Lanham Act trade-dress protection?"1
6
Part I defines trade dress. Part II discusses the elements that must
be shown to obtain Lanham Act protection for trade dress. Part III
introduces Wal-Mart and the current state of the secondary meaning
doctrine, and Part IV examines the effect of Wal-Mart on trade dress
law. Part V discusses the factors that various circuits use to establish
secondary meaning, and Part VI surveys recent trade dress litigation
that illustrates the current state of the secondary meaning doctrine
and indicates the direction in which trade dress litigation appears to
be heading.
I. TRADE DRESS IN THE CONTEXT OF TRADEMARK LAW
According to a widely cited definition, trade dress "involves the
total image of a product and may include features such as size, shape,
color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales
techniques." 7 Trade dress is a subset of trademark law and is also
protected, whether registered or unregistered, by the Lanham Act. 8
Typically, trade dress litigation is brought under section 43(a) of the
Act, which addresses unregistered marks.' 9 The Lanham Act grants
trade dress owners "the exclusive right to use the trade dress and the
right to prevent confusion of the consuming public in the
marketplace." 20 Despite the application of these statutory provisions,
Congress has not succeeded in passing a federal trademark bill for
21trade dress. Instead, trade dress law has common law origins and
16 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 528 U.S. 808, 808 (1999) (granting certio-
rari).
17 John H. Harland Co. v. Clark Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11 th Cir. 1983).
s The Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (2000).
19 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000). This is true, for instance, of the three most recent Su-
preme Court cases discussing trade dress: Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S.
763, 763 (1992); Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 205; and TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 23. In fact, in
1992, the Supreme Court affirmed that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act clearly pro-
vides protection for both registered and unregistered trademarks in Two Pesos, 505 U.S.
at 765 n.2.
20 See WILLIAM E. LEVIN, TRADE DRESS PROTECTION § 1:4, at 1-10 (1996).
2 Congress attempted to pass an applicable trademark bill in 1998, A Bill to
Amend the Trademark Act of 1946 to Provide Protection for Trade Dress, and for
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continues to be primarily judge-made in the federal courts.2 As this
Comment will argue, the common law evolution of trade dress law has
led to significant variance in how courts define and protect trade
dress, and occasionally, the Supreme Court has stepped in to referee.
Trade dress may be divided into two general categories: product
packaging and product design. As the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition23 made clear, trade dress traditionally covered the packag-
ing or labeling of a product, but now can encompass the "overall ap-
pearance or image of goods and services." 24 The extension of trade
dress protection to product design is a fairly recent development,
25
and the courts are still in the process of working out just what kind of
protection is available to trade dress owners. The secondary meaning
discussion in this Comment illustrates one aspect of trade dress law
that has been in flux.
II. PROTECTING TRADE DRESS UNDER THE LANHAM ACT
To recover for trade dress infringement or unfair competition
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must prove three
26elements by a preponderance of the evidence. First, the plaintiff
Other Purposes, H.R. 3163, 105th Cong. (1998), but it died after a subcommittee hear-
ing.
22 LEVIN, supra note 20, § 1:4, at 1-11 (citing L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe
Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Indeed, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is
the only section of the Act that specifically mentions trade dress by name, stating that
"[i]n a civil action for trade dress infringement under this Act for trade dress not regis-
tered on the principal register, the person who asserts trade dress protection has the
burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a) (3) (2000).
23 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. A (1993).
24 Id.; see also J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 8.01 [3], at 8-9 (4th ed. 1996) (noting that the "traditional definition of
trade dress was limited to the overall appearance of... packaging[,] ... [and o]ver a
period of years, ... expanded to. . . include[] the totality of any elements in which a
product or service is packaged... [and] ... to encompass... the shape and design of
the product itself").
21 While common law protection for product packaging predates 1976, one com-
mentator believes "the first successful 'product imitation' action brought under section
43 of the Lanham Act" specifically protecting product design to be Truck Equip. Serv.
Corp. v. Fruehauf, Corp. (TESCO), 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976). Graeme B. Din-
woodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of Product Design Trade Dress, 75 N.C.
L. REV. 471, 478 n.20 (1997) (citingJessica Litman, Note, The Problem of Functional Fea-
tures: Trade Dress Infringement Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
77, 83 (1982)).
26 See, e.g., Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 936 (6th Cir.
1999) (stating the burden of proof required), rev'd on other grounds, 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
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must show that the two marks are so similar that there is a likelihood
of confusion, which occurs when there is "any word, term, name, sym-
bol, or device, or any combination thereof.. . which is likely to cause
confusion ... as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods. '27
The second element the trade dress owner must prove is that "the
appropriated features"28 of the trade dress are primarily nonfunc-
tiona129 -a burden that is particularly hard to overcome in product de-
sign cases, where the physical function of the object and its appear-
ance are by definition intertwined. The Supreme Court, relying on
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, has stated that a design is
"functional" if its "'aesthetic value' lies in its ability to 'confer a signifi-
cant benefit that cannot practically be duplicated by the use of alter-
native designs.'
30
The third, and most contentious, element a trade dress owner
must establish is that the mark is distinctive.3' This requirement can
be met in one of two ways. First, the mark may be "inherently distinc-
tive" because it is a particularly unique, and therefore strong, trade-
mark. Under the most widely used taxonomy, trademarks may be
27 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000). This provision applies to unregistered trade
dress. The provision applicable to registered trade dress states that infringement of a
registered trade dress consists of using in commerce, without the permission of the
registrant, "any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered
mark... [if] such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive."
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000).
28 TrafFix, 200 F.3d at 936.
For registered trade dress, the relevant statutory language is contained in sec-
tion 2(e)(5) of the Lanham Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (5) (2000)), which
states that a trademark may be refused registration if it "comprises any matter that, as a
whole, is functional." For unregistered trade dress, the relevant statutory language is
contained in section 43(a)(3) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2000)), which re-
quires that the person asserting protection of an unregistered trademark bears the
"burden of proving... [it] is not functional."
30 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 170 (1995) (quoting RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c (1993)). In Qualitex, the
Court did ultimately find that the plaintiff could obtain trademark protection for the
green-gold color of its ironing pads since the color acted "as a symbol that distin-
guishes a firm's goods and identifies their source, without serving any other significant
function." Id. at 166.
31 In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court specified that the distinctiveness requirement is
explicit in the Lanham Act only for registered trade dress. For unregistered trade-
marks and trade dress, distinctiveness is a common law requirement "universally im-
posed" to prevent "confusion ... as to ... origin." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara
Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000) (citing the Lanham Act at § 43(a) (1) (A), 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a) (1) (A) (Supp. V 1994)).
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grouped "in an ascending order which roughly reflects their eligibility
to trademark status and the degree of protection accorded[.] [T]hese
classes are (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbi-
trary or fanciful. ' 2 Some examples of marks falling under these cate-
gories include: "shredded wheat," a generic mark for shredded wheat
cereal;33 "Fish-Fri," a descriptive mark for fish batter mix; 34 "Copper-
tone," a suggestive mark for sunscreen; 35 and "Kodak," an arbitrary
mark for film and camera products.36 Only suggestive, arbitrary, and
fanciful marks, "because their intrinsic nature serves to identify a par-
ticular source of a product, are deemed inherently distinctive and are
entitled to protection." At the other end of the scale, generic marks
381may not be protected at all.
Between these two extremes are marks that, though not inherently
distinctive, can acquire distinctiveness over time, thereby obtaining
trademark protection. For example, descriptive marks are not consid-
ered to be inherently distinctive, but as the Supreme Court stated in
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,39 "descriptive marks may acquire
the distinctiveness which will allow them to be protected under the
[Lanham] Act.",4 Thus, while inherent distinctiveness is automatically
assumed based on the substance of the mark alone, acquired distinct-
41iveness, also called secondary meaning, must be proven through ex-
trinsic evidence. 4' The Supreme Court defined secondary meaning as
arising when, "in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a
[mark] is to identify the source of the product rather than the
32 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
33 Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116 (1938).
34 Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 796 (5th Cir.
1983).
3' Douglas Lab. Corp. v. Copper Tan, Inc., 210 F.2d 453, 455 (2d Cir. 1954).
36 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Weil, 243 N.Y.S. 319, 321 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1930).
37 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992).
M See id. at 768 ("[G]eneric marks.., are not registrable as trademarks.").
39 Id. at 763.
40 Id. at 769.
41 Id.
42 For a particularly lucid explanation of the difference between inherent and ac-
quired distinctiveness, see Dinwoodie, supra note 25, 485-89. That article explains that
inherently distinctive marks enjoy "instant protection" because "inherent distinctive-
ness can be presumed immediately upon use," id. at 488, while descriptive marks must
establish secondary meaning through "evidence of actual consumer association" and
"must await the development of the evidence from which it can be inferred, and thus
protection is not available upon first use." Id. at 487-88.
2004] 1667
1668 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 152:1661
product itself."43 The Second Circuit has found secondary meaning
where "'the public is moved in any degree to buy an article because of
its source.'
4 4
III. WAL -MART AND THE SECONDARY MEANING DOCTRINE
In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court refused to find that trade dress,
as it applies to product design, is inherently distinctive. Instead, the
Court required the plaintiffs to demonstrate that their product design
had acquired secondary meaning. The litigation leading to Wal-Mart
arose when Samara Brothers, Inc., a designer of children's "spring/
summer one-piece seersucker outfits decorated with appliques
of hearts, flowers, fruits, and the like,"5 discovered that its upscale
clothing had been copied and was being sold at cut rates by discount-
46ers such as Wal-Mart, Kmart, and Caldor. After settling with the
other defendants, Samara sued Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. for, among other
claims, infringement of unregistered trade dress under the Lanham
Act.
4 7
Samara had good reason to be sanguine about its chances to pre-
vail against Wal-Mart. In Two Pesos, the Supreme Court had upheld
the trademark rights of a chain of Mexican fast-food restaurants for
trade dress described as "a festive eating atmosphere having interior
dining and patio areas decorated with artifacts, bright colors, paint-
ings and murals."48 Surely this set of characteristics was no more spe-
cific and persuasive a type of trade dress than the clearly defined ele-
ments of Samara's children's clothing.
Moreover, in Two Pesos, the Court had made two key points on the
issue of inherent distinctiveness. First, the Court found that the plain-
tiff, Two Pesos, Inc. had satisfied the distinctiveness requirement by
having its trade dress classified as suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful-
the three categories of trademark that enjoy automatic inherent
distinctiveness.49 Second, to underscore this point, the Court held
43 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.l1 (1982).
44 Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 143 n.4 (2d Cir. 1997)
(quoting Paper Cutter, Inc. v. Fay's Drug Co., 900 F.2d 556, 564 (2d Cir. 1990)).
45 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 207-08 (2000).
46 Id. at 208.
47 Id.
48 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765 (1992) (quoting Taco
Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1991)).
" Id. at 768. The Fifth Circuit had previously stated that "the jury finding that the
trade dress is not merely descriptive [nor functional] means that the dress is arbitrary,
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that "proof of secondary meaning is not required to prevail on a claim
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act where the trade dress at issue is in-
herently distinctive."
50
Relying on Two Pesos, Samara argued that its clothing designs
should be "legally protected as distinctive trade dress for purposes of
Section 43(a). "" By so doing, Samara had hoped to satisfy the dis-
tinctiveness requirement by demonstrating that its mark was inher-
ently distinctive, without having to present the additional evidence re-
quired to prove a secondary meaning analysis.
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed and found that Samara's
clothing designs were more analogous to a trademarked color that
"could eventually 'come to indicate a product's origin' ... [and]
could be protected upon a showing of secondary meaning."5' The essence
of the holding is that, "in an action for infringement of unregistered
trade dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product's design is dis-
tinctive, and therefore protectable, only upon a showing of secondary
meaning. '5
The Court specifically rebutted Samara's efforts to analogize its
situation to Two Pesos, in which the trade dress was found to be inher-
ently distinctive:
Two Pesos unquestionably establishes the legal principle that
trade dress can be inherently distinctive ... but it does not es-
tablish that poduct-design trade dress can be. Two Pesos is inap-
posite to our holding here because the trade dress at issue, the
d6cor of a restaurant, seems to us not to constitute product
design. It was either product packaging.., or else some tertium
quid that is akin to product packaging and has no bearing on
the present case.
54
Many commentators have criticized the peremptory nature of
Wal-Mart's classification of Two Pesos' "festive" restaurant decor as
product packaging and Samara's children's clothing as product
fanciful, or suggestive. We need not determine which of these three categories prop-
erly characterizes the trade dress, because all three entitle Taco Cabana to protection
without proof of secondary meaning." Taco Cabana Int'l, 932 F.2d at 1120 n.8.
50 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 776.
51 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 208.
52 Id. at 212. The Court in Wal-Mart relied on its holding in Qualitex Co. v.Jacobson
Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162-63 (1995), to reach this conclusion. For a discussion of
the Qualitex holding regarding color and distinctiveness, see supra text accompanying
note 30.
53 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 216.
5 Id. at 214-15.
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55design. Yet once trade dress is classified as either product design or
product packaging, the consequences, under Wal-Mart, are clear:
since "product design almost invariably serves purposes other than
source identification, 56 there is a higher burden for proving distinct-
iveness in product design than there is in product packaging.
The Wal-Mart Court pointed out that there was no widely accepted
test for inherent distinctiveness and doubted that such a test was even
possible, stating "where product design is concerned we have little
confidence that a reasonably clear test can be devised., 5 7 The Court
further rebuffed the suggestion by Samara to adopt the inherent dis-
tinctiveness test developed by the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (the predecessor to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit) in Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd that
considered:
whether it was a 'common' basic shape or design, whether it
was unique or unusual in a particular field, [and] whether it
was a mere refinement of a commonly-adopted and well-known
form of ornamentation for a particular class of goods viewed by
the public as a dress or ornamentation for the goods . .
Finally, the Court stated that "given the unlikelihood of inherently
source-identifying design, the game of allowing suit based on alleged
,,60inherent distinctiveness seems to us not worth the candle, since
these trade dress owners could also seek patent or copyright protec-
tion for their designs. While this may be true, the Wal-Mart Court was
also well aware that design owners would prefer trademark protec-
tion 61-which is perpetual, so long as the mark is in use-over patent
5 One article notes that the Two Pesos Court had "treated trade dress as a unitary
concept; that is, it made no distinction between product packaging and product design
trade dress." Samuels & Samuels, supra note 12, at 46. This article also notes that, in
the years after Two Pesos, courts around the country struggled "to determine if trade
dress is a design or packaging." Id. at 59-60; see also Paul A. Briganti, Renovating Taco
Cabana: The Lanham Act's Protection of Product Design After Samara, 38 CAL. W. L. REV.
481, 504 (2002) (criticizing as unfounded the Court's statements "in conclusory terms
that restaurant decor constitutes product packaging").
Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213.
57 Id.
58 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
Id. at 1344, quoted in Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 214.
60 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 214.
61 The Lanham Act provisions discussing trademark registration and unlimited
renewal rights are set out in sections 8 and 9 of the Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057-
1059 (2000)). For unregistered trademarks, the relevant statutory provision is 15
U.S.C. § 1125 (2000), which is section 43 of the Lanham Act.
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protection6 2 (twenty years from date of filing) or copyright protection 6
(life of author plus seventy years).
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF WAL-MART
Wal-Mart affected the law of product design trade dress in two
ways. First, it clarified the distinctiveness requirement for trade dress.
Second, it narrowed the scope of protection available and thereby
created incentives for trade dress owners to argue that their marks are
product packaging rather than product design. Contrary to initial
fears expressed at the time of the decision, Wal-Mart does not stand
for the proposition that trade dress cannot be protected. Instead, as
in the cases discussed below, it has even assisted product design own-
ers to prevail against infringers. Yet the decision has rightly been
criticized for confusing as much as clarifying the issue.
A. Critique of Wal-Mart's New Distinctiveness Standard
Wal-Mart attempted to clarify the law of trade dress by finding that
distinctiveness could be established for product design only through a
showing of secondary meaning 64 Further, the Court maintained the
test for secondary meaning that had been set forth in Inwood Laborato-
ries.65 Wal-Mart, therefore, was intended to be a straightforward solu-
tion to a troubling circuit split. In the period between the 1992 hold-
ing in Two Pesos and the 2000 decision in Wal-Mart, courts had found
that product design could be inherently distinctive.6 Unfortunately,
62 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2) (2000).
63 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 216 (holding that a "product's design is distinctive, and
therefore protectible, only upon a showing of secondary meaning").
65 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 211 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456
U.S. 844, 851 n.l (1982)). The Inwood Laboratories test, as described by the Court in
Wal-Mart, states that "a mark has acquired distinctiveness, even if it is not inherently
distinctive, if it has developed secondary meaning, which occurs when, 'in the minds of
the public, the primary significance of a [mark] is to identify the source of the product
rather than the product itself."' Id.
Some examples of cases from 1992 to 2000 in which courts had found product
design to be inherently distinctive include Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises
Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1446-52 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that, while product configuration
could be inherently distinctive under certain circumstances, Duraco's Grecian urn-
shaped plastic planters were not so "unusual and memorable" as to satisfy this circuit's
three-prong test for inherently distinctive product design), and Ashley Furniture Indus-
tries, Inc. v. SanGiacomo N.A., 187 F.3d 363, 366 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that a "prod-
uct's configuration qualifies as inherently distinctive trade dress if it is capable of func-
tioning as a designator of an individual source of the product").
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the trouble was, federal courts were "hopelessly conflicted on what the
proper test was for determining whether a product design is inher-
ently distinctive."6 7  There were conflicting inherent distinctiveness
tests in use in the Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits.68 After
Wal-Mart, in any trade dress claim involving product design, distinct-
iveness must be shown through evidence of secondary meaning. Wal-
Mart's bold move to wipe out inherent distinctiveness with respect to
product design, however, drew the ire of trademark commentators,
who criticized the decision as "ill advised, " ' ° one which "solved one
problem ... [but] a study of its wake reveals twice as many concerns."7 1
Another observer considered that the decision was fundamentally
flawed as the Court did not answer the question it had posed in grant-
ing certiorari, thereby confusing the litigating parties: "[T]he Su-
preme Court did not hand down a decision explaining 'what must be
shown to establish that a product's design is inherently distinctive for
purposes of Lanham Act trade dress protection.' Instead, the Court
punted."7 2 This critique probably explains why Samara, in its brief to
the Supreme Court, argued for the Seabrook inherent distinctiveness
test, rather than amassing the evidence needed to prove that its cloth-
ing designs had acquired secondary meaning. 3 The plaintiff simply
could not have anticipated from the writ granting certiorari that sec-
ondary meaning would replace inherent distinctiveness as the central
issue in the case.
A second criticism levied at Wal-Mart's efforts to clarify the law is
that eliminating inherent distinctiveness essentially permits "competi-
tors [to] freely copy unique designs early in the product's life, thus
preventing the establishment of secondary meaning. 7 4 The case law
examined in the next Section certainly bears this criticism out. In all
the cases where secondary meaning was found, the product designs in
question had been in use for years, if not decades, leaving unanswered
67 Samuels & Samuels, supra note 12, at 51.
See id. at 48-51 (describing the conflicting tests for inherent distinctiveness de-
veloped in Ashley Furniture, 187 F.3d at 366; Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytags Ltd., 71 F.3d 996
(2d Cir. 1995); Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995); Duraco Prod-
ucts, 40 F.3d at 1446-52).
69 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 216.
70 Samuels & Samuels, supra note 12, at 63.
71 Briganti, supra note 55, at 505.
72 Ferretti, supra note 12, at 437 (quoting Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213-14) (emphasis
added).
73 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213-14.
74 Ferretti, supra note 12, at 418.
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the question of what a litigant launching a new product can or should
do to protect its trade dress in a product design .
B. Narrowing the Scope of Trade Dress Protections
The two ways in which Wal-Mart has narrowed the scope of protec-
tion for trade dress are (1) it forced courts to distinguish between
product packaging and product design, since their definitions are es-
sential to applying the correct analysis for distinctiveness, and (2) it
recommended that lower courts should be conservative in making this
determination, thereby automatically limiting the number of products
likely to earn the now-desirable distinction of product packaging over
product design. Without explaining the need for such caution, the
Wal-Mart decision merely stated that other courts should "err on the
side of caution and classify ambiguous trade dress as product design,
thereby requiring secondary meaning.
"
,1
These changes have led some commentators to point out that Wal-
Mart has introduced a new level of complexity into trade dress design,
since the "application of different tests to packaging and design cases
is impractical and unwarranted."77 Another commentator observed
that forcing a choice between product packaging and product design
will again ultimately lead to a circuit split, since "lower courts again
will develop conflicting tests. It is therefore possible that varying re-
sults will be seen on similar types of trade dress, depending on each
circuit's test."
8
In Wal-Mart itself, the Court acknowledged the potential prob-
lems of forcing courts to distinguish product packaging from product
design:
There will indeed be some hard cases at the margin: a classic glass Coca-
Cola bottle, for instance, may constitute packaging for those consumers
who drink the Coke and then discard the bottle, but may constitute the
product itself for those consumers who are bottle collectors, or part of
the product itself for those consumers who buy Coke in the classic glass
75 One possible response by trade dress owners can be seen in their sharply rising
number of Lanham Act registrations since 2000. "[F]ederal trade dress registration
makes any validity challenge an uphill battle for competitors that choose to copy
distinctive dress," so registration is a first step toward protection of new trade dress.
William Levin, A Rush to Register Trade Dress, NAT'L L.J.,Jan. 8, 2001, at B7.
76 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 215.
77 Samuels & Samuels, supra note 12, at 63.
78 Ferretti, supra note 12, at 444.
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bottle, rather than a can, because they think it more stylish to drink from
the former. 79
The Court did not attempt to solve this conundrum, stating only
that it believed that "the frequency and the difficulty of having to dis-
tinguish between product design and product packaging will be much
less than the frequency and the difficulty of having to decide when a
product is inherently distinctive. '" 80 Whether this has proven true is
debatable. One could look at a trademark author's efforts to graphi-
cally clarify the confusion. In attempting to distinguish between "Wal-
Mart product design" and "Two Pesos trade dress," the author has
placed restaurant and retail drcor squarely in the Two Pesos category of
trade dress that could be found to be inherently distinctive.8 '
However, a 2001 case in the Ninth Circuit belies such an easy
characterization. In Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc.,82 the plain-
tiff owner of a chain of pool halls, sued a competitor for trade dress
infringement for copying his halls' unique decor.13 While this fact pat-
tern might seem reminiscent of Two Pesos, the similarities stop there
because the court did not follow the Wal-Mart characterization of Two
Pesos restaurant decor as product packaging or "some tertium quid that
is akin to product packaging"8 4 (either of which could be inherently
distinctive). Instead, the Ninth Circuit turned without comment to a
discussion of whether the pool hall decor had acquired secondary
meaning-without discussing inherent distinctiveness at all.85  The
plaintiffs ultimately prevailed, but not without having to do the heavy
evidentiary lifting needed to show secondary meaning, including in-
troducing consumer surveys and extensive testimony evidence of copy-
ing.s6
79 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 215.
80 Id.
81 THOMAS P. ARDEN, PROTECTION OF NONrTRADITIONAL MARKS: TRADEMARK
RIGHTS IN SOUNDS, SCENTS, COLORS, MOTIONS AND PRODUCT DESIGN IN THE U.S. 51
(2000).
82 251 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 2001).
83 Id. at 1256. The decor is described at length in the decision and includes the
floral carpet, mahogany wood, lighting fixtures, tile, igns, drinks rails, layout, color
schemejuke boxes, type of trash cans, and video games. Id. at 1256-57.
84 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 215.
Clicks Billiards, 251 F.3d at 1262-64. One possible explanation for this is a strate-
gic decision on the part of Clicks Billiards, Inc., which had "not claimed that its trade
dress is inherently distinctive, only that it has acquired secondary meaning." Id. at
1258 n.1,
86 Id. at 1262-64.
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Surveying recent cases, however, we find that less appears to turn
on the product design-product packaging axis than might have been
expected. After Wal-Mart, courts have generally devoted little or no
time to analyzing whether the trade dress in question is product
design or product packaging. For instance, in Coach, Inc. v. We Care
Trading Co.,87 a successful product design case, the discussion of sec-
ondary meaning does not even mention the possibility that the plain-
tiff might try to characterize the handbags' features as product pack-
aging. 88 Similarly, Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imports & Exports,
Inc.,s9 a successful furniture design case, quickly disposed of the prod-
uct design-product packaging issue.90 In a third case (in which the
trade dress owner lost), David White Instruments, L.L.C. v. TLZ, Inc.,91
the court somewhat confusingly referred to the "design or dress" of
the product, but applied the product design analysis of secondary
meaning in any event.92
Perhaps one exception to the general brevity on the product de-
sign-product packaging issue can be found in Yankee Candle Co. v.
Bridgewater Candle Co.,93 in which the plaintiff argued (unsuccessfully)
that the shelving, labels, and catalog, all "trappings associated with the
sale of the candle," were either product packaging or a "tertium quid"
analogous to product packaging.9 The court was puzzled by what it
termed a "combination trade dress claim" of such disparate elements,
but fell back on the Supreme Court's advice in Wal-Mart to "err on
the side of caution" in doubtful cases: "We follow that advice here.
To prevail on its combination claim, Yankee must show that its trade
dress has acquired secondary meaning.95
87 No. 99-11672, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9879, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2001), affd,
No. 01-7968, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 13568 (2d Cir. May 20, 2002); see also infra Part
VI.B.2. (providing a more extensive discussion of Coach).
88 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9879, at *21-22 (discussing secondary meaning in the
context of trade dress only).
89 270 F.3d 298 (6th Cir. 2001).
90 See id. at 310 (stating that there was no ambiguity about how to characterize the
furniture at issue: "This is not a hard case .... Herman Miller's trade dress claim re-
garding the Eames lounge chair and ottoman are based on product design and cannot
be confused with product packaging").
91 No. 2-7156, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23410 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 2002).
92 Id. at *12.
93 259 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2001); see infra notes 116-123 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the reasons that Yankee Cande failed the secondary meaning inquiry).
94 259 F.3d at 40.
95 Id. at 41 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000)).
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From these cases, it appears that Wal-Mart's instructions to err on
the side of product design have had their effect not only in cases in
which a single aspect of a product is in question, but also those in
which, arguably, one of several elements might be found to be prod-
uct packaging. Instead, the product design label has been attached to
the whole combination.
V. THE SECONDARY MEANING FACTORS
The Wal-Mart Court narrowed the scope of protection for trade
dress owners by holding that they were obliged to prove secondary
meaning. The Court, however, did not explicitly state how secondary
meaning was to be ascertained. 96 Determining secondary meaning is,
as the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition explains, "a question of
fact, with the burden of proof on the person claiming rights in the
designation."97 The Lanham Act does not use the phrase "secondary
meaning," stating instead that such acquired product identification
has occurred when a mark "has become distinctive of the applicant's
goods in commerce."98 This distinctiveness is one of the requirements
to prove likelihood of confusion for both a registered and unregis-
tered trademark, without which there would be no protection avail-
able for trademarks or trade dress.9
Since the Lanham Act does not specify a statutory test, it has been
left to the courts to define the kinds of evidence necessary to establish
secondary meaning. In its discussion of distinctiveness and secondary
meaning, Wal-Mart made no specific reference to the common law
test for secondary meaning,'°° an omission perhaps explained by the
fact that courts have widely employed the secondary meaning factors
96 See supra Part IV (discussing the effect of Wal-Mart on the secondary meaning
doctrine). In TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., a product design case that
came before the Supreme Court in the term following Wal-Mart, the plaintiff's failure
to establish nonfunctionality meant that the issue of secondary meaning was never
reached. See 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001) ("Functionality having been established, whether
MDI's dual-spring design has acquired secondary meaning need not be considered.").
97 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 cmt. e (1995); see also
Suzanne R. Chauvin & Nancy A. Wamement, Pleading and Proving the Claim, in
LITIGATING TRADEMARK, TRADE DRESS, AND UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES 9, 15 (ALI-
ABA Comm. on Continuing ProfI Educ. ed., 2002) (reporting that the determination
of acquired secondary meaning is "a question of fact").
9s Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 (2000).
99 See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 210 (discussing the distinctiveness requirement under
the Lanham Act as explicit in the case of registered trademarks and implicit for unreg-
istered trademarks).
100 See id. at 210-13 (discussing distinctiveness and secondary meaning).
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for many years.'O° In spite of the long history of common law defini-
tions of secondary meaning, disparate approaches to secondary mean-
ing among circuit courts have left the exact criteria in doubt. Indeed,
the survey below of recent secondary meaning litigation reveals that
circuits vary both in the types of factors considered and in the depth
of evidentiary support required.
An early articulation of an exhaustive secondary meaning test is
found in Echo Travel, Inc. v. Travel Associates°2 in which the Seventh
Circuit articulated foundational types of evidence probative of secon-
dary meaning:
Direct Evidence
(a) direct consumer testimony
(b) consumer surveys
Circumstantial Evidence
(c) exclusivity, length, and manner of use
(d) amount and manner of advertising
(e) amount of sales and number of customers
(f) established place in the market
(g) proof of intentional copying.
The tests or sets of factors used to evaluate secondary meaning in
the other circuits are all variations on this basic theme. 0 4 Indeed, the
Sixth Circuit employs an identical seven-factor test. 0  Likewise, the
First Circuit uses a seven-factor test to evaluate whether "vigorous evi-
dentiary requirements" for secondary meaning have been satisfied.' 6
The Second Circuit uses a somewhat modified version of the fac-
tors used in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, considering with ap-
proximately equal weight the following six factors:
(1) advertising expenditures,
(2) consumer studies linking the mark to a source,
(3) unsolicited media coverage of the product,
101 See infra Appendix (comparing the common law secondary meaning factors
considered by the circuits).
102 870 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1989).
103 Id. at 1267.
104 For a discussion of how secondary meaning factors are used directly and indi-
rectly by the courts to "infer consumer association," see Dinwoodie, supra note 25, at
487-88 & n.52.
105 Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 311-12 (6th
Cir. 2001).
106 See Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 43-45 (1st Cir.
2001) (describing the secondary meaning factors and attributing them to Boston Beer
Co. v. Slesar Bros. Brewing Co., 9 F.3d 175, 181 (1st Cir. 1993), I.P. Lund Tradingv. Kohler
Co., 163 F.3d 27, 42 (1st Cir. 1998), both of which predate Wal-Mart).
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(4) sales success,
(5) attempts to plagiarize the mark, and
(6) length and exclusivity of the mark's use.1 °7
The Second Circuit's test suggests a predilection for finding sec-
ondary meaning in products that have been successful in the market-
place and that have gained popular recognition in the press. The
Second Circuit appears to be the only circuit to consider "unsolicited
media coverage" as probative of secondary meaning. 18
In contrast to the other circuits, which favor six- or seven-factor
tests, the Tenth Circuit cites a brief list of secondary meaning factors
including "(1) a history of successful sales; (2) evidence of intentional
copying[] . . . and (3) long use of the... trade dress."' 9 Yet the brev-
ity of the list should not be taken to indicate that the Tenth Circuit is
more permissive in its interpretation of secondary meaning require-
ments than other circuits. To the contrary, because this circuit applies
a narrow interpretation to the few factors it does consider when mak-
ing a determination of secondary meaning, the end result is that trade
dress owners litigating in the Tenth Circuit may have a harder time
proving secondary meaning than they would elsewhere. °
Of the circuits that have engaged in a discussion of secondary
meaning, the Ninth Circuit has taken perhaps the most lenient ap-
proach. The court found a "triable issue of fact" in a recent case in
which only two types of evidence-survey evidence and proof of copy-
ing-were introduced to support a claim of secondary meaning."'
Moreover, the court found that, "in appropriate circumstances, delib-
erate copying may suffice to support an inference of secondary mean-
ing.
"
0
2
107 Coach, Inc. v. We Care Trading Co., No 99-11672, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9879,
at *21-22 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2001) (attributing the factors used in determining secon-
dary meaning to Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 143 n.4 (2d Cir.
1997)).
108 Id. at *21-22.
'0' Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 978 (10th Cir. 2002).
110 For instance, in comparison with some of the other circuits, this court gives but
little weight to sales volume. See id. at 978 (noting that the Sixth and Third Circuits do
consider sales volume as part of a secondary meaning analysis). Further, the Tenth
Circuit places a restriction on the use of "long use of the trade dress," finding that long
use, without a finding of exclusivity, is immaterial to a finding of secondary meaning.
See id. at 978 n.4 (attributing the Tenth Circuit's exclusivity requirement toJ.M. Huber
Corp. v. Lowery Wellheads, Inc., 778 F.2d 1467, 1470 (10th Cir. 1985); the Lanham Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2000)).
IU Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1263-64 (9th Cir. 2001).
l1 Id. at 1264.
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As this review suggests, the evidentiary requirements to prove sec-
ondary meaning are highly court-specific; the factors that may be dis-
positive in one circuit will not necessarily prove persuasive in an-
other.113  But now that the Supreme Court has placed increased
importance on secondary meaning, it may be necessary for the Court
to create a unified evidentiary standard for how secondary meaning
can be established. In the meantime, however, circuits continue using
their own standards that, despite their variation, allow some product
design owners to prove that their mark has acquired secondary mean-
ing.
VI. SECONDARY MEANING IN ACTION: RECENT LITIGATION
Recent case law shows that, when courts apply the secondary
meaning factors, outcomes are quite varied. In some cases, the pro-
tection accorded or denied to trade dress seems to follow predictably
from the application of the secondary meaning test to the fact pattern;
in other cases, the court seems to have made more of a stretch to
achieve its results.
A. When Secondary Meaning Is Not Found
While this Comment highlights how some product design owners
have successfully adapted to the more rigid requirements for secon-
dary meaning since Wal-Mart, it would be misleading to suggest that
most product design owners succeed. While I am not aware of any
empirical studies quantifying the failure rate of product design cases
since 2000, successful cases appear to be few and far between."
4
In recent cases in which trade dress owners have tried, and failed,
to prove secondary meaning, the judicial opinions cite a variety of
shortcomings. Two stand out in particular: poor evidence and a poor
definition of the trade dress at issue.
"3 For a detailed discussion of secondary meaning factors and variation among the
circuits, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13, Reporters' Note to
cmt. e (1995).
114 For instance, of the four "successful" product design cases discussed in this
Comment, only two, Coach, Inc. v. We Care Trading Co., No 99-11672, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9879, at *21-22 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2001), and Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Im-
ports &Exports, Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 311-12 (6th Cir. 2001), are explicitly about product
design. Further, a search of primary materials and secondary sources found few simi-
larly successful cases.
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1. A Lack of Survey Evidence Defeats Claims: Yankee Candle Co. v.
Bridgewater Candle Co. and David White
Instruments, LLC v. TLZ, Inc.
Courts have denied trade dress protection when there is a lack of
"direct evidence of secondary meaning, such as consumer surveys or
testimony,"" 5 or a finding that market dominance "cannot alone be
sufficient to demonstrate secondary meaning."" 6 For instance, in Yan-
kee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., the plaintiff failed to convince
the court that the trade dress of its scented candles was product pack-
aging and not product design. Yankee Candle Co. was therefore
forced to attempt to fulfill the First Circuit's strict version of the sec-
ondary meaning test.
117
Yankee Candle concerned a complaint brought by a manufacturer
against a competitor for infringing its trade dress by copying a method
of displaying the candles, the "overall 'look and feel' of Yankee's
Housewarmer line of candles," and the layout of Yankee's catalog."8
This is one of the few trade dress cases in which the plaintiff tried to
circumvent the onerous secondary meaning test by asserting that its
trade dress was product packaging."' Further, Yankee argued that,
since each of the trade dress elements originated in "arbitrary"
choices, its trade dress should be deemed inherently distinctive.
2 0
The district court held that Yankee fell "far short" of the eviden-
tiary requirements by failing to introduce any survey evidence, which
the First Circuit terms the "'preferred' manner of demonstrating sec-
ondary meaning. ,12' This failing could not be remedied by Yankee's
extensive circumstantial evidence of secondary meaning, including
proof that the candles had been marketed since 1985, data showing
J15 judge Applies Wal-Mart in Rejecting Trade Dress Claims for Medical Equipment: Con-
tinental Lab. Prods. v. Medax Int'l, 7 ANDREWs INTELL. PROP. LITIG. REP. 12 (2000)
(summarizing holding denying trademark infringement claim of a manufacturer of
medical equipment against an admitted copier).
116 Court Extinguishes Most of Candle Company's Copyright, Trade Dress Suit: Yankee
Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 24 ANDREWS INTELL. PROP. LITIG. REP. 6 (2000)
(summarizing case denying infringement claims of a scented candle maker).
117 Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 39 (1st Cir. 2001).
118 Id. at 38-39.
"9 Id. at 40.
120 Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 32-37 (describing the standard for
inherent distinctiveness as including "arbitrary" marks).
121 Yankee Candle, 259 F.3d at 38-39 (citing Boston Beer Co. v. Slesar Bros. Brewing Co.,
9 F.3d 175, 182 (lst Cir. 1993)).
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substantial advertising outlays, sales figures demonstrating market suc-
cess, and proof of intentional copying.
2
To the definite disadvantage of the product design owner in this
case, the First Circuit applied the narrowest possible construction to
both elements needed to show distinctiveness. First, finding that Yan-
kee Candle's trade dress was on the border between product design and
product packaging, the court applied Wal-Mart's default rule that re-
solves such doubt in favor of product design. Second, the court ap-
plied the secondary meaning factors and found that the lack of survey
evidence was fatal to finding secondary meaning.
12
3
In another case with a similar outcome, David White Instruments,
LLC v. TLZ, Inc.,124 David White argued that TLZ had infringed on
novel and non-functional aspects of its patent, particularly the prod-
uct's physical appearance and design.' Essentially bypassing an
analysis of the plaintiffs definition of its trade dress as either productS 126
design or product packaging, the court turned directly to an analysis
of the secondary meaning factors: "direct consumer testimony, con-
sumer surveys, length and manner of use, amount and manner of ad-
vertising, volume of sales, place in the market and proof of intentional
copying."
127
Upon examining the evidence presented, the court found that the
plaintiff failed, at least in part, on two of these factors. The plaintiff
did not produce "any specific customer surveys" to substantiate its tes-
timony that the David White product line enjoyed broad recognition
among its customers,1 8 and its advertising "arguably" promoted "the
functional features of the product as opposed to its distinctive trade
dress.", 2 9  While David White did show evidence of substantial,
longtime sales and revenues and a "long-standing reputation for
122 Id. at 44-45.
125 Id. at 43.
124 No. 02-7156, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23410 (E.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 2002).
1 Id. at *7-8 (describing the trade dress features as "(1)the 'rounded-delta' level
vial recess; (2) the raised semi-cylindrical midsection; (3) the proximal body member
with a flat top, a flat bottom and rounded sides; and (4) the overall proportions and
relationships of the components").
126 Id. at *11-12.
127 Id. at *12 (quoting the original source of the factors, Spraying Systems Co. v. De-
lavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 393 (7th Cir. 1992) and a subsequent use of them, Bretford
Mfg., Inc. v. Smith System Mfg. Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 951, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2000)).
128 Id.
19 Id. at *13.
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manufacturing reliable, high-quality instruments," 31 the court did not
determine whether or not secondary meaning was satisfied. Instead,
the court sidestepped the issue, concluding that, "even assuming that
this was sufficient to establish secondary meaning, plaintiff has failed
to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the issue of customer confu-
sion. ,
13
Yankee Candle or David White might have had a very different re-
ception in other, more lenient, circuits, such as the Ninth Circuit, in
which a trade dress claim was successful even though the plaintiff pro-
vided only a customer survey (admitted to be "of little or no value")
and circumstantial evidence of copying to prove secondary meaning.
132
Clearly, the survey evidence requirement is inconsistently interpreted
and applied across various circuits.
2. Failing to Define the Elements of Trade Dress:
Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc.
The Second Circuit in Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc.133 failed to
reach a detailed secondary meaning discussion because the court was
dissatisfied with the plaintiffs definition of its trade dress. 34 Yurman
Design, Inc., designed and manufactured jewelry with copyrighted de-
signs, based on a common motif of twisted cables and gemstones.'
3 5
The jewelry had been manufactured and widely distributed since
1982. 1 6 In 1998, PAJ, Inc., a competitor, began manufacturing copies
of Yurman designs, and litigation for copyright and Lanham Act viola-
tions ensued. 37 Despite the jury's finding that "Yurman's trade dress
was distinctive as to the jewelry's source, and that twenty PAJ bracelets,
earrings, and rings infringed the trade dress because they were likely
IM Id.
13' Id. at *13-14.
132 See Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1263-64 (9th Cir.
2001) (reconciling the weak customer survey with more persuasive circumstantial evi-
dence). In contrast, in a Sixth Circuit case in which the owner had presented no sur-
vey evidence at all, the court stated that "[s]urvey evidence is not the only relevant evi-
dence" to support a finding of secondary meaning for product design trade dress.
Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 312 (6th Cir. 2001)
(citing Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 269 (5th Cir. 1999)).
133 262 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2001).
134 Id. at 117-18.
135 Id. at 107.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 107-08.
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to cause confusion concerning the source of PAJ'sjewelry,", 13 the Sec-
ond Circuit reversed. 'I
The chief weakness in Yurman Design's trade dress claim, dis-
cussed at some length in the court's opinion, was that 'Turman itself
ha[d] never identified the elements that ma[d]e up its trade dress."
40
Ironically, the court itself had no trouble coming up with a clear
definition of Yurman Design's trade dress: "a structural, almost indus-
trial motif of twisted multi-strand cable, executed with a polished and
elegant finish, and set off by gemstones." 14 1 But the company's own
vague definition of its trade dress, "the artistic combination of cable
[jewelry] with other elements," proved fatal to Yurman Design's trade
dress claim.
14
Yurman Design's omission was particularly unfortunate because
two other cases decided at roughly the same time, on similar facts,
avoided this pitfall. Herman Miller (argued before the Sixth Circuit in
November 2000, three months prior to Yurman Design, but decided in
October 2001, three months after Yurman Design) listed nine protect-
able elements of its lounge chair and essentially bombarded the court
with factual evidence to support these assertions. 43  Similarly, the
plaintiff in Coach (argued and decided in the Southern District of New
York in July 2001) concretely defined its trade dress and successfully
supported that definition with empirical evidence.144 Given these par-
allel cases, it would be fair to surmise that the outcome of Yurrnan De-
sign was due, at least in part, to poor advice from counsel in present-
ing the trade dress claim.
B. Successful Efforts to Prove Secondary Meaning
The cases discussed above illustrate the burden borne by product
design owners, who must not only clearly state their trade dress by
successfully describing visual objects in words, but must also present
138 Id.
139 Id. at 107.
140 Id. at 114.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 117 (alteration in original).
143 Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 302 (6th Cir.
2001). The court notes that Herman Miller produced "over five hundred pages" of
descriptions of the chair contained in various publications and in affidavits of design
experts. Id. at 302-03.
144 Coach, Inc. v. We Care Trading Co., No. 99-11672, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9879,
at *3-7 (S.D.N.Y.July 18, 2001).
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adequate evidence to prove to the courts that they have skirted the
functionality minefield and have shown the clear link in consumers'
minds between their product and its source. The outcomes in these
and other cases show that this dual exercise is not always an easy one
and that trade dress owners will often be disappointed.
Yet, as will be discussed in this Section, there are a few recent cases
in which plaintiffs have successfully proven that the design elements of
their products have acquired secondary meaning. Two of the most
notable examples include Herman Miller145 and Coach.146 These and
other cases show that, while trademark protection may be difficult to
attain for trade dress owners faced with the burden of establishing
secondary meaning, it is not an impossibility.
Successful or not, recent trademark litigation in the area of prod-
uct design illustrates that Wal-Mart is having less of a dampening im-
pact than observers had initially feared. The very fact that trade dress
owners continue to argue secondary meaning defies the Court's pro-
nouncement in Wal-Mart that "product design almost invariably serves
purposes other than source identification." 47 As the following cases
illustrate, some litigants have indeed shown that even if this were true,
their product also has a source-identifying function, since they have
successfully proven secondary meaning.
1. Abundant Evidence Supports a Claim: Herman Miller, Inc. v.
Palazzetti Imports & Exports, Inc.
This litigation concerns the famous Eames lounge chair and ot-
toman, designed in 1956 by Charles and Ray Eames and produced ex-
clusively and continuously since that time by licensee Herman Miller,
148Inc. In 1995, Herman Miller sued Palazzetti Imports & Exports,
Inc., a New York manufacturer of reproduction furniture, for trade-
mark and trade dress infringement caused by advertising and selling
an "Eames chair and ottoman" without clearly stating that its product
was a reproduction unaffiliated with Herman Miller.
149
145 Herman Miller, 270 F.3d 298 (6th Cir. 2001).
46 See No. 01-7968, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 13568 (2d Cir. May 20, 2002) (affirming
and vacating without published opinion), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1108 (2003). The Sec-
ond Circuit's decision is reported in full in an unpublished opinion found at Nos. 01-
7968, 01-9162, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 28143 (2d Cir. May 20, 2002). Further citations
to the Second Circuit's decision will refer to this unpublished opinion.
147 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000).
W Herman Miller, 270 F.3d at 301-02.
149 Id. at 305-06.
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The Sixth Circuit's holding in this case is particularly relevant to
my examination of secondary meaning because it is detailed in the
court's discussion of recent changes in trade dress law. The court
stated that Wal-Mart clarified and improved "the protectability analysis
in a trade dress claim based on product design.' 50 In the period be-
tween the 1992 Two Pesos holding that trade dress could be inherently
distinctive and the 2000 Wal-Mart ruling that product design
demanded a showing of secondary meaning, the circuits had been
split over which test should be applied to which type of trade dress.15'
The Sixth Circuit found that the Eames chair was unambiguously
product design, not product packaging, and therefore rejected the
lower court's discussion of inherent distinctiveness in favor of an
analysis of whether the chair had acquired secondary meaning.
1
5
2
The Sixth Circuit's analysis refers to a set of seven factors articu-
lated by TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.5 3 as a "test" for
secondary meaning. 15 4 This test, later applied in Herman Miller, has no
statutory basis; instead, it is another expression of the judicially cre-
ated law in this area. Perhaps, the term "test" was merely a semantic
slip, since the court was careful to note that "[n]o single factor is de-
terminative and every one need not be proven.' 5 Whatever the status
of these factors, the Sixth Circuit found that Herman Miller estab-
lished secondary meaning by presenting evidence sufficient to satisfy
six of the seven secondary meaning factors employed by the Sixth Cir-
cuit." 6 The only factor for which Herman Miller presented no evi-
dence was that of consumer surveys. 57 The court gave approximately
equal weight to all the satisfied elements,158 and in so doing, showed
'5 Id. at 308.
151 Id. at 309-11.
'5 Id. at 310.
13 200 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
.54 Herman Miller, 270 F.3d at 311.
155 Id. at 312. This statement may indicate that the decision does not have the
mandatory quality of a "test." An alternate explanation might be that the Herman Miller
court considered the seven factors to be so well established in the common law that
they had attained "test" status.
15 Id. at 314-16 (quoting TrafFix, 200 F.3d at 937). In TrafFix, the Sixth Circuit
held that the plaintiff manufacturer of traffic sign stands had established secondary
meaning for its product design (for which it held an expired patent), but the Supreme
Court subsequently reversed on a finding of functionality. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v.
Mktg Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 35 (2001).
17 Herman Miller, 270 F.3d at 315.
158 For a discussion of evidence presented for each of the elements, see id. at 312-
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that Wal-Mart and TrafFix do not stand for the proposition that trade
dress protection is unattainable for product design. In fact, these Su-
preme Court holdings arguably eased the finding of secondary mean-
ing for the Eames chair by rejecting the lower court's decision to deny
the plaintiffs trade dress claims based on the fact that the chair was
not inherently distinctive.' 59
Instead, Wal-Mart and TrafFix opened the door to a reexamina-
tion of secondary meaning that turned out favorably for Herman
Miller-particularly because, unlike the First and Seventh Circuits,' °
the Sixth Circuit was willing to find secondary meaning in the absence
of consumer surveys. 161 The court also gave a generous interpretation
to the background secondary meaning requirement that the trade
dress serve a source-identifying function: while the general public did
not associate the Eames chair with its manufacturer, the fact that "the
consuming public in modem furniture" was well aware that Herman
Miller made the Eames chair was held sufficient to establish secondary
meaning in the product design. 62
Herman Miller is a case in which the court applied a liberal inter-
pretation of the secondary meaning factors, a process likely eased by
the fact that the plaintiff had produced a deluge of evidence-the re-
cord contained more than five hundred pages. 16 This was clearly a
case in which the plaintiffs had studied, and learned from, the failures
of other trade dress litigants.
2. Defeating a Copycat: Coach, Inc. v. We Care Trading Co.
In 2003, the Second Circuit affirmed a trade dress infringement
case brought by the manufacturer of prestigious Coach handbags
against a copycat who was selling knockoffs for pennies on the dol-
lar.' 64 The Southern District of New York granted a permanent injunc-
tion (subsequently scaled back by the Second Circuit)65 to prevent the
159 Id. at 309-10. The Sixth Circuit rejected the district court's finding that Her-
man Miller's evidence for advertising and number of chairs sold was insufficient to sat-
isfy the secondary meaning elements. Id. at 312-14.
See supra Section VI.A. 1 (discussing Yankee Candle and David White).
Herman Miller, 270 F.3d at 315.
162 Id. at 316.
163 Id. at 302-03.
'64 Coach, Inc. v. We Care Trading Co., Nos. 01-7968, 01-9162, 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 28143 (2d Cir. May 20, 2002).
1' The Second Circuit held that the injunction, which had prevented We Care
Trading Co. from selling all handbags made of "glove-tanned leather and bound
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infringer from copying any three of the following four design ele-
ments of Coach's "Classic Collection" handbags: "glove-tanned
leather, bound edges, heavy brass or nickel-plated brass hardware, and
a rectangular handbag with a beaded chain."'66
The district court relied on Wal-Mart to define secondary mean-
ing. 1 67 The court also elaborated by quoting the Second Circuit's
statement that "Is]econdary meaning existing where 'the public is
moved in any degree to buy an article because of its source.'""6 To de-
termine whether secondary meaning exists in the case of Coach
handbags, the court applied six factors, a non-exhaustive list including
"(1) advertising expenditures, (2) consumer studies linking the mark
to a source, (3) unsolicited media coverage of the product, (4) sales
success, (5) attempts to plagiarize the mark, and (6) length and exclu-
sivity of the mark's use., 169 The court found that Coach had presented
evidence to satisfy all six of these factors and was particularly per-
suaded by findings that the plaintiff had produced extensive customer
surveys; that Coach had spent millions marketing its bags, which had
been on the market for nearly forty years; and that its products had
been plagiarized to the tune of 200,000 handbags a year, including
some handbags manufactured by the defendant itself.
70
The defendant's attempts to defeat the trade dress by showing that
one or more of the protectable elements were functional did not suc-
ceed. Instead, the court stated that "[t]he TrafFix decision does not
overrule Second Circuit law that a collection of functional features
may nonetheless be protectable trade dress.
"
,
7
1
In Coach, the Second Circuit's analysis was favorable to the plain-
tiff in one significant respect: the court was willing to accept a suc-
cinct description of the trade dress-far shorter and less detailed than
edges," was overbroad and added the requirement that the forbidden handbags also
have "either the distinctive Coach hardware or its tag." Id. at *14.
16 Robert T. Maldonado, Is that a Coach Bag? Product Configuration Trade Dress in
the Second Circuit, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, July 2002, at 29.
167 The decision quotes Wal-Mart's definition of secondary meaning as existing
where, "'in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a [mark] is to identify
the source of the product rather than the product itself."' Coach, Inc. v. We Care
Trade Co., 99-11672, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9879, at *21 (S.D.N.Y.July 18, 2001) (quot-
ing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000)).
1s Id. (quoting Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 143 n.4
(2d Cir. 1997)).
169 Id. at *21-22 (quoting Genesee Brewing Co., 124 F.3d at 143 n.4) (internal quota-
tions omitted).
170 Id. at *22.
171 Id. at *27-28.
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the lengthy nine-part description presented to the Sixth Circuit in
Herman Miller.112 Perhaps even more relevant is a comparison to a case
decided in the same circuit, GTFM, Inc. v. Solid Clothing, Inc., which,
like Coach, also concerned trade dress of an entire collection of goods,
rather than a single item (such as the Eames chair) " In GTFM, the
plaintiff was a manufacturer of upscale "hip-hop" clothing that had
been copied by a competitor and sold at a discount.14 The trade dress
infringement aspect of the suit failed because the court found that
plaintiff's definition of its trade dress was "altogether too broad to be a
protectable source-identifying expression. ,
1 75
This outcome is somewhat surprising, considering that, unlike the
facts in Yurman Design, plaintiff GTFM, Inc. had offered the court a
lengthy and detailed six-part definition for each of its football and
baseball jersey lines of clothing, elaborating on each set of elements
including various subelements and specifying such details as the
placement of patches and the types of colors in use.176 However, the
court was unpersuaded by these efforts, finding that the definition did
not show that "the overall look of its baseball and football jerseys is
consistent across each of the product lines" 77 and, thus, did not meet
the requirement that a product line must have a consistent "overall
look.",7 8 While the Coach court also had to consider the defendant's
argument that Coach's trade dress was impermissibly vague, it did not
analyze whether an even higher level of specificity is required for trade
dress in a collection of goods.
79
172 Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 302 (6th Cir.
2001) (describing the trade dress of the Eames chair).
173 GTFM, Inc. v. Solid Clothing, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
174 Id. at 277-78. All of the defendant's subsequent post-trial motions (to recon-
sider the injunction, to vacate, and to grant a new trial) have all been denied. See No.
01-2629, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15422 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2002) (denying motion for
reconsideration), No. 01-2629, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24620 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2002)
(denying motions to vacate and for a new trial).
175 GTFM, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 299 (quoting Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d
101, 118 (2d Cir. 2001)).
176 Id. at 280-83.
177 Id. at 299.
178 Id.
179 Coach, Inc. v. We Care Trading Co, No. 99-11672, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9879,
at *17-18 (S.D.N.Y.July 18, 2001).
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3. Product Design or Product Packaging: Sally Beauty Co. v.
Beautyco, Inc.
Sally Beauty Co. involves the issue of whether the courts must af-
firmatively distinguish product design and product packaging.' 80 In
this case, the Tenth Circuit, displaying greater leniency than other cir-
cuits, did not make much of the distinction-to the advantage of the
plaintiff Sally Beauty Co. This case illustrates the discretion that
courts have to treat similar fact patterns quite differently.
The trade dress in dispute involved the packaging of a hair care
product marketed by Sally Beauty. Specifically, the case involved the
use of a bullet-shaped, white bottle with a flat, black cap; text on the
product's label; and very similar product names. In its approach to
the trade dress infringement claim, the court did not sever the color
and shape of the bottle from the labeling; it simply considered the "to-
tal look" of the product. 82 This analysis differs in procedure from
Wal-Mart's approach to a product design case, which would automati-
cally assume that the product design is descriptive and, therefore, re-
quire proof of secondary meaning.13  Instead, the court employed
Wal-Mart's approach to product packaging and first determined
whether the trade dress was descriptive. Once the court concluded
that the trade dress was descriptive, it then required a showing of sec-S 184
ondary meaning.
To prove secondary meaning, Sally Beauty argued that it had "(1)
a history of successful sales; (2) evidence of intentional copying by
Beautyco; and (3) long use of the Sally Beauty trade dress. 'aSO0 While
the court mentioned that the Third and Sixth Circuits have also con-
sidered the volume of sales in considering secondary meaning and1 86.
likelihood of confusion, it was satisfied by Sally Beauty's three factors
and concluded that "a genuine issue of material fact exists whether
Sally Beauty's trade dress has acquired distinctiveness . 87  This
180 Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 970 (10th Cir. 2002).
181 Id.
182 See id. at 977 (analyzing the trade dress based on the product's "overall image
and appearance").
183 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000).
184 Sally Beauty, 304 F.3d at 977.
185 Id. at 978.
186 Id. (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280
F.3d 619, 640 n.14 (6th Cir. 2002); Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software
Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 283 n.10 (3d Cir. 2001)).
187 Id. (footnote omitted).
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relatively low evidentiary burden offers hope for new market entrants
who have not yet attained the volumes of sales that time-honored
companies such as Coach and Herman Miller have established in dec-
ades of doing business. Moreover, compared to the outcome in Yan-
kee Candle, this is another example of a trade dress owner prevailing
in an infringement claim without any customer survey evidence.
4. Customer Surveys and Deliberate Copying:
Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc.
In Clicks Billiards,9 the owner of a chain of pool halls complained
that a competitor had allegedly copied the d~cor of his establish-
ments. The circuit court reversed the lower court's grant of summary
judgment, in part, based on the trade dress issue. 9 ' In the secondary
meaning discussion, the court focused its attention on just two par-
ticular types of evidence introduced by Clicks Billiards, Inc.: a cus-
tomer survey'9 and evidence of deliberate copying.1
92
Neither of these factors was without controversy at the district
court level. The trial court found that the "survey is not without
flaws," and "[p]ut bluntly, the survey is of little or no value" because
the respondents offered vague responses to follow-up questions.19 3 On
appeal, the circuit court, found that since the lower court had admit-
ted the survey rather than excluding it as impermissibly flawed, "the
survey admitted by the district court raises questions of material fact
with respect to secondary meaning that may not be disposed of by the
court alone."094 Therefore, these were matters to be decided by ajury,
which precluded a finding of summary judgment against Clicks Bil-
liards.' 95
The plaintiff got similarly favorable treatment by the court of ap-
peals on the issue of evidence of copying. The district court had
found that testimony and affidavits suggesting that Sixshooters, Inc.'s
owners had visited Clicks Billiards on numerous occasions and had
8 See supra notes 115-122 and accompanying text (describing the First Circuit's
analysis of the lack of secondary meaning owing to the plaintiff's failure to produce
consumer surveys).
"' 251 F.3d 1252, 1256 (9th Cir. 2001).
190 Id. at 1267.
19' Id. at 1262-64.
192 Id. at 1264.
193 Id. at 1262-63.
194 Id. at 1264.
195 Id.
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even measured the fixtures in Clicks was, in total, "slight" and "con-
tested.' 96 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit held that such an evaluation
precluded a finding of summary judgment, since "the district court is
prohibited from weighing evidence and deciding issues of contested
fact."' 97 Aside from this evidence of intentional copying and the con-
sumer survey results, however, the Ninth Circuit did not demand a
further showing of other factors tending to support a finding of sec-
ondary meaning.
CONCLUSION
To paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of the death of product design
trade dress claims have been greatly exaggerated.98 Though, as we
have seen, cases in which product design owners succeeded in proving
secondary meaning may be few in number, their very existence con-
firms what one observer stated in regard to Herman Miller: "Although
product design trade dress claims may be on life support, this case
shows they're not totally dead yet. "' 99
The nature of the products at issue in the "successful" cases may
give some indication of factors likely to persuade to a court consider-
ing secondary meaning. For instance, the products protected in Her-
man Miller and Coach are exclusive, highly marketed, and broadly rec-
ognized. These characteristics place such products in a privileged
position with respect to proving secondary meaning. Indeed, in an ar-
ticle discussing the litigation, the Coach attorney observed that dicta in
a 2000 decision involving the French luxury accessory manufacturer
Hermes, Int'l "paved the way for the affirmance received by Coach for
its handbags," since the Hermes court "noted that plaintiff's heavily
marketed handbags 'continue to indicate their source.' 20 0 Similarly,
watch and jewelry manufacturer Cartier won a preliminary injunction
against a manufacturer who had copied its Pasha and Grille design
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 The Twain quotation is from an 1897 letter in which he wrote that "the report
of my illness grew out of [another man's] illness, this report of my death was an exag-
geration." See Letter from Mark Twain (May 1897), in Barbara Schmidt, Mark Twain
Quotations, Newspaper Collections, & Related Resources, at http://www.twainquotes.com/
Death.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2004).
19 Barber, supra note 114, at 259 (discussing Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazetti Imports
&Exports, Inc., 270 F.3d 298 (6th Cir. 2001)).
200 Maldonado, supra note 166, at 30 n.25 (quoting Hermes Int'l v. Lederer de
Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2000)).
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201watches. In finding acquired distinctiveness, the court praised as "a
fine example of secondary meaning... 'the world-renown Cartier
brand[,] .... [noting it is] instantly identifiable ... by even the most
lightweight watch lover.'
20 2
Yet, exclusivity and international recognition cannot explain
everything; otherwise, the expensive and heavily marketed jewelry at
issue in Yurman Design2 0 3 would have shown secondary meaning. Con-
versely, the low-cost shampoos and conditioners that proved secondary
204meaning in Sally Beauty might not have met the required evidentiary
burden. Further, had the Ninth Circuit found global or national rec-
ognition necessary to a finding of secondary meaning in the new, post-
Wal-Mart world, it might have considered Clicks Billiards differently
since the case concerned a small regional chain of billiard halls in the
Southwest and a competitor with a single establishment.' °5
Aside from the perhaps unexpected persistence of product design
claims after Wal-Mart, the recent cases point to a storm brewing on the
horizon: the growing inconsistencies in the factors by which the vari-
ous circuits evaluate secondary meaning. Wal-Mart may have settled
the quarrel in the circuits over the old inherent-distinctiveness test,
but the Supreme Court will likely soon have to take up the matter of
distinctiveness in product design to define the appropriate criteria for
secondary meaning. The secondary meaning factor that seems most
obviously in flux at the moment is the consumer-survey requirement.
Survey evidence was deemed essential by the First Circuit, which called
it the "'preferred' manner of demonstrating secondary meaning.
2 0 6
Yet, the Tenth Circuit found secondary meaning entirely absent ofconsmer urves inSall " 207
consumer surveys in Sally Beauty, and the Ninth Circuit considered
even flawed surveys to benefit the trade dress owner in Clicks Bil-
liards.
20 8
20' Cartier, Inc. v. Four Star Jewelry Creations Inc., No. 01 11295, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7844, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2003).
202 Id. at *25-26 (citing Rudiger Bucher, Comparative Test: Chronos with the Frederic
Piguet Caliber 1185, WATCHTIME (June 2001)).
20' Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2001).
211 Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 970 (10th Cir. 2002).
205 Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1256 (9th Cir. 2001).
206 Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 39 (1st Cir. 2001)
(citing Boston Beer Co. v. Slesar Bros. Brewing Co., 9 F.3d 175, 182 (1st Cir. 1993)).
207 Sally Beauty, 259 F.3d at 978.
2" Clicks Billiards, 251 F.3d at 1262-63.
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Wal-Mart asserted that pleading inherent distinctiveness is "not
worth the candle., 20 9 After Wal-Mart eliminated inherent distinctive-
ness for product design cases, the action now has turned to whether,
and how, trade dress owners can meet the sometimes substantial evi-
dentiary burden of proving that the design has acquired the necessary
secondary meaning to show distinctiveness.
The broader policy question raised by this shift is the degree to
which the courts can or will protect the product designs of new market
entrants. Secondary meaning tests, in all their various guises, favor es-
tablished players, since in every case the purpose of the secondary
meaning inquiry is to determine whether the trade dress serves a
source-identifying function. The Supreme Court argued against an
inherent-distinctiveness test in Wal-Mart partly because such a test
could hurt new entrants by making them vulnerable to strike suits.
2 1 °
Now the question is whether the evidentiary burden of secondary
meaning, and the inconsistency with which the matter is treated across
circuits, will have the same detrimental effect on the competitive abil-
ity of trade dress owners to protect their product designs.
209 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000).
211 See id. at 213 ("Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competi-
tion with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily
serves by a rule of law that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants based
upon alleged inherent distinctiveness.").
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Types of Secondary Meaning Evidence Presented By
Plaintiffs in Trade Dress Infringement Claims
Surveys' Testimony2 Use3  Advert.' Sales5  Estab. 6 Intent. Other
Copy
Yankee Xs X X X X X
Candle'
Yurman
Design0  _
Coach X X X X" X x1
Herman X X X X X X
Millers
Echo X X X X X X X
Travel
Clicks X X
Billards
Sally X X X
Beauty
David X X X13 X X X
White'
Consumer surveys
2 Consumer testimony
Long and exclusive use of mark
4 Advertising amount and manner
5 Amount of sales and number of customers
6 Established place in the market
7 Proof of intentional copying
8 Court referenced lack of surveys provided by party
9 Employee or competitor testimony used by party
10 Decision not reached because definition provided by party was inadequate
11 Required "sales success" of party
12 Discussed unsolicited media coverage
13 Court referenced advertised functional features
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Table 2: Success of Plaintiffs in Trade Dress Infringement Claims
Based on Evidence Presented
Court Case Result
First Circuit Yankee Candle Fail
Second Circuit Yurman Design Fail
Second Circuit Coach Pass
Sixth Circuit Herman Miller Pass
Seventh Circuit Echo Travel Pass
Ninth Circuit Clicks Billiards Pass
Tenth Circuit Sally Beauty Pass
Eastern District of Illinois David White Fail
* * * * * *
